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Abstract 
The volume of remittances in Georgia has been growing every year since 2001, but so has the size of the 
economy. This means that the share of remittances fluctuated at 5-7 percent of GDP, 2001-2010. Survey 
data indicate that one-tenths of households receive remittances, while the size of a typical monthly 
transfer amounts to 265 GEL (149 USD), most of it delivered via formal money transfer systems. There 
is a positive association between economic growth and remittances, but the causal effect is apparently 
limited to trade services because, on average, 80 percent of received transfers is spent on primary 
consumption. Remittances are linked to a households’ propensity to save and to have bank accounts and 
the higher interest in various investment options. Remittances have only a marginal impact on small 
business activity in rural recipient households and are associated with lower employment chances. 
Linkage between inflation and remittance is vague. However in those months when remittances increase, 
the monthly inflation rates, typically, decrease. Recipient households spend more on education and 
healthcare and urban recipients also report higher subjective health status and educational enrollment. 
The effect on inequality and poverty is not straightforward because households in the middle income 
range benefit disproportionately from remittances. Still, the regions with the higher rates of recipient 
households do experience lower levels of poverty, while individuals from recipient households have 
higher subjective and objective perceptions of welfare. Remittances arguably create moral hazard, at the 
public level, as the elderly and the poorest are less likely to be remittance recipients. This coincides with 
the social policies implemented, 2004-2012 , when the increase of old-age pensions and the introduction 
of targeted social assistance became a priority for the government. 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Data and methods  
This report uses macro and micro data from various sources. The National Bank of Georgia provides 
annual, quarterly and monthly statistics on remittances by country of origin and by transfer mode. For 
comparative reasons data from the World Bank’s Migration and Remittances Database is also 
employed. Related data on economic and social developments are derived from the National Statistics 
Office of Georgia and the Social Service Agency, as well as other sources and reports. Micro data 
derive from: the 2007 National Public Opinion Survey on Remittances in Georgia and Life in 
Transition Survey for 2006 and 2010 both by EBRD; the Caucasus Barometer and EU Survey for 
various years by the Caucasus Research Resource Centers; the data from the Georgia on the Move 
Survey for 2008 by the Institute for Public Policy Research; and the 2007 Survey of South Caucasus 
by Bendixen and Associates. In addition to synthesising and illustrating the existing findings from the 
scholarly literature, this report employs several complementary methodological approaches. These 
include: basic bivariate correlations or the description of changes in various relevant variables over 
time; and ordinary least squares and linear probability regressions, using the long series of monthly, 
quarterly and yearly data to explore how remittances associate with various dependent variables.  
Emigration from Georgia 
In 2011, more than 50 percent of respondents in a nationally representative social survey reported at 
least one family member or close friend living abroad. The initial and most intense emigration wave in 
the history of independent Georgia started in 1989 and lasted until the middle of 1990s. In 1997-2003, 
negative net emigration was maintained, but the number of migrants more than halved; while during 
the most recent migration phase, 2004-2011, changes in political, economic and social life coincided 
with positive net migration rates. The recent trends have been increasingly viewed as being driven by 
economic reasons. They, therefore, have important implications for remittances. The profile of 
migrants – working age population, married, with children, unemployed in Georgia from poorer 
households – indicates that emigration would have strong associations with remittances as the 
household members left behind almost certainly require financial assistance from migrants. The 
available data indicate that Russia and Ukraine, are the main destination countries in the former Soviet 
Union, while among the Western destinations Germany, Greece, and the US dominate. Evidence also 
suggests that emigration not only determines remittances, but also that remittances have an effect on 
emigration by stimulating the desire to emigrate among recipients.  
Trends in remittances 
Macro-level data on remittances 
Two items from the current transfers section of the Georgian balance of payments– workers’ 
remittances and other personal transfers – can be considered as the official volume of remittances in 
Georgia. In absolute terms personal remittance increased from 46.8 in 1995 to 1175.3 million USD in 
2011. The estimates from the National Bank of Georgia are slightly higher than those provided by the 
World Bank. The volume of remittances has been growing every year since 2001, but so has the size 
of GDP, which means that the share of remittances fluctuated at 5-7 percent of GDP, 2001-2010. The 
2008 economic crisis in Georgian migrants’ main destination countries – e.g. Russia, Ukraine, and 
Greece – meant that remittances grew, in nominal terms, at a lower rate than the nominal growth of 
GDP in Georgia. This meant that the share of remittances in overall economic output fell. Alternative 
estimates for remittances can be derived from the payments of electronic transfers according to which 
the ten major remittance sending countries in order of importance -Russia, the USA, Italy, Greece, 
 
 
Ukraine, Turkey, Spain, Germany, UK, and Kazakhstan – account for about 90 percent of all monetary 
transfers to Georgia.  
Remittances in household level surveys  
Those nationally representative social surveys, which contain information about remittances, are very 
helpful for understanding the nature of remittances at the micro-level. Five different datasets for 2006-
2010 indicate that the spread of remittances varies between 8.3 and 14.3 percent of all remittance 
receiving households. The same datasets show that residents of Tbilisi are those most likely to receive 
remittances and that rural residents are the least likely to receive the same. Estimates for 2010 suggest 
that monthly remittances received by a typical household amount to as much as 265 GEL (149 USD)1
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in Georgia. This is close to EBRD’s estimate of 189 GEL (106 USD) in 2006 and the Georgia on the 
Move project’s estimate of 219 GEL (147 USD) monthly remittances in 2008. The largest amounts of 
remittances per transfer are sent from the North American destinations, about GEL 300 (201 USD) in 
2008. Most transfers take place via formal money transfer systems, but informal channels, such as a 
courier or a family member travelling to or from Georgia accounted for nearly one third of 
transactions. Informal remittances appear to be higher in rural areas, probably because of the 
undeveloped financial infrastructure in rural Georgia.  
The survey data indicate that the probability of remitting is negatively associated with the size of 
migrant groups: number of migrants who reside together, generally family members or close friends. 
Migrants are more likely to remit back home if they leave their children behind and have more 
frequent contacts with the recipient household. Similarly, they are more likely to remit if that 
household is located in a rural area and if the remitters are located in Western Europe, Northern 
America and Turkey and if remitters are well educated and have a job. The duration of stay abroad is 
also an important factor. The third year of stay provides the highest expectations for remittances, but 
this effect diminishes over time. On the other hand, the probability of receiving remittances is 
positively associated with residency in urban areas. The young aged 18-24 and adults aged 50-64 are 
slightly overrepresented among recipients. The receipt of remittances is negatively associated with the 
number of retirees in the families and the number of male adults in general. The least educated, 
employed, and the poorest are significantly under-represented, while the most educated, unemployed, 
relatively wealthier individuals are over-represented among recipient households. Households in 
Samtskhe-Javakheti, Samegrelo-Zemo Svaneti, and Imereti and households with ethnic minority status 
have the higher probability of being recipients. 
The development and the side effects of remittances to Georgia 
Remittances and growth 
Economic growth in recent years was primary led by a few selected sectors such as construction, 
financial intermediation, manufacturing and trade services. The growth in the last sector is arguably 
the most affected by remittances because, on average, 80 percent of received transfers are spent on 
primary consumption. By 2010, the volumes of foreign direct investments and remittances were 
equal. Remittances remained one of the main sources to mitigate high negative current account 
balance and it contributed to the share of imported goods, industrial and food products, which is 
very high in the consumption structure. Estimates from the computable general equilibrium model 
suggest that without remittances private consumption and GDP growth rates would decrease by 
                                                     
1 This, and all other, conversions of currency are done with the average yearly exchange rate of the National Bank of 
Georgia.-  
respectively, 24.7 and 13.3 percent. The regression analysis, meanwhile, shows a strong positive 
correlation between economic growth and remittances, both probably being the product of broader 
economic trends in the region and the world. 
Remittances, investment and financial development 
Georgia is characterized by low levels of gross national savings. This is often explained by low 
incomes and the country’s financial culture. But the banking sector remains one of the most developed 
in the economy. The financial assets coming from external sources, other than remittances, have been 
identified as the main component of loans and investments in Georgia, but remittances receipt is 
linked to households’ propensity to save. Recipients in urban areas and higher income brackets, and in 
more frequent receipt of remittances are much more likely to have bank accounts. Recipients also have 
higher interest than general population in various investment options such as loans to finance a 
business, or a mortgage to buy or build a home. Indeed, some fragmented evidence suggests that a part 
of remittances is accumulated for investment in real estate. Nevertheless, the regression analysis does 
not reveal that the monthly growth of deposits in commercial banks is significantly related to the 
monthly growth of remittances, 2002-2012.  
Remittance and employment  
Employment is one of the most important social problems in Georgia. Since the 1990s unemployment 
has remained at double digit levels, while two sharp increases were the result of public administration 
reforms in 2004-2006 and the consequences of the economic crisis in 2008-2009. Available studies 
indicate that remittances have only marginal impact on small business activity in rural households with 
absent migrant members. The primary analysis for this report also shows that living in a recipient 
household reduces employment chances in Tbilisi, urban and rural areas, especially when remittances 
serve as the main source of income. On the other hand, remittances are, respectively, negatively and 
positively associated with being inactive and being unemployed and looking for a job. Apparently, 
remittance provides resources to search for a better job and simultaneously drives up the reservation 
wage of job-seekers.  
Remittance and inflation  
Inflationary processes intensified in Georgia after 2004, when more robust fiscal and monetary 
policies increased the broad measures of money supply. Regressing the monthly data points, 2000-
2012, on inflation rates and the corresponding monthly data points on various measures of remittances, 
it becomes evident that remittances have a statistically significant and negative relationship with 
inflation rates: in other words, in those months when the remittances increase, the monthly inflation 
rates, on average, decrease. However, in January 2008 to June 2012, one month lagged remittances 
have positive and significant associations with the rate of inflation. If there is, indeed, any significant 
association between remittances and inflation, then the effect might stem from the appreciation of the 
Georgian Lari and the relative decrease of prices of imported goods.  
Remittances and human capital formation  
Insufficient education, lack of competitive qualifications and skills, and poor health status are 
identified as predictors of labour market performance in Georgia. If the relative share of expenditure 
on education in household consumption remained the same, 2001-2011, the share of healthcare 
expenditure almost doubled over the same period. Survey evidence indicates that: a quarter of 
remittance recipient households used them for education (an extra 66 GEL annual expenditure); and 
one-fifth for health/life insurance purposes (an extra 221 GEL annual expenditure). These effects are 
especially apparent in Tbilisi and other urban areas. In the latter type of settlement individuals from 
recipient households also report a higher subjective health status, while for those under the age 30, the 
probability of being in education increases in the capital city.  
 
 
Remittances, poverty and income inequality  
Poverty and inequality levels remain consistently high in Georgia, but the role of remittances in social 
welfare is not clear. Available evidence indicates that households in the middle income range benefit 
disproportionately from remittances compared to the poorer households. In those cases remittances 
may intensify inequality and poverty, if the latter is estimated by relative poverty measures. 
Remittance flows do not affect all sectors and residents symmetrically and have a rather limited 
impact in terms of poverty and income inequality. Overall, this report finds that regions with the 
higher rates of recipient households experience lower levels of poverty. Individuals, meanwhile, who 
live in recipient households see themselves as being higher on the socio-economic ladder. they 
experience better welfare outcomes and they spend more than non-recipient households.  
Remittances, public moral hazard, informalised welfare and policy trap 
Remittances arguably play an important role in the political economy of social welfare in Georgia. 
Neoliberal economic and social policies, founded on the idea that the private sector should drive the 
country‘s advancement, intended to reduce public involvement in private lives by reducing regulations 
and the size of the civil service in the country. Remittances were most likely viewed as one of the 
components of that private sector. The elderly and the poorest are less likely to be remittance 
recipients than the younger and the better-off, which coincides with the social policies implemented 
since 2004, when an increase in old-age pensions and the introduction of targeted social assistance 
became the priority for the government. A moderate but negative correlation has also been observed 
between the number of remittance recipients and the number of social assistance beneficiaries in 
Georgian regions. This might suggest that remittances serve as a social safety net for those individuals 
who are not the poorest but who would be in need of targeted social assistance without remittances. 
Regression analysis indicates, too, that remittances are negatively correlated with receiving any type 
of government benefits. At the same time, the country started to implement more inclusive migration 
policies by effectively allowing dual citizenship and granting a number of political and economic 
rights to expatriates.  
 
1. Introduction 
An appraisal of growth and an examination of the side effects of remittances in Georgia are both 
important and timely exercises. After all, in 2009, the country was among the world’s top 10 
remittance recipients (World Bank, 2011), while in 2011 money transferred from abroad amounted a 
record high of USD 1.26 billion, up 20.5% from 2010 (NBG, 2012). For Georgia remittances are the 
most important source of external financing after net official development assistance and official aid 
and close, numerically, to foreign direct investments. Since the end of 1990s they have arguably 
served as a cushion against the economic and political turbulence brought about by the transition and 
associated reforms (Mansoor and Quillin, 2006). A significant portion of the Georgian population are 
unable to cover major human needs: given this remittances constitute 6.9 percent of GDP in 2005 and 
are vital for the livelihood of recipient households (Caucasus Research Resource Centres, 2007). 
Furthermore, Georgia in the last few years started to conduct more proactive citizenship policies 
toward its expatriates. It did so, inter alia, to promote links between its foreign residents and domestic 
socio-economic development (Gugushvili, 2012b). Remittances in Georgia are correlated to the same 
two-bloc pattern as emigration, while emigration is itself mostly driven by economic considerations. 
The European Union, particularly Greece and Italy, and the Former Soviet Union states, particularly 
Russia and Ukraine, are the main sources of remittances to Georgia.  
Fragmented evidence exists that, since the 1990s, remittances have played a key role in poverty 
alleviation, especially for ethnic minorities which have been socio-politically and economically 
excluded in Georgia (Caucasus Research Resource Centres, 2007). However, there has not been a 
systemic assessment of the impact of remittances on development and their possible side effects. It is 
well know that the bulk of remittances are spent on consumption rather than savings and investments. 
But the causal links between remittances and economic growth are not clear. It has been also argued 
that remittances decrease the motivation to work and to undertake innovative entrepreneurial 
activities. However, existing studies do not control for various employment statuses among recipients. 
Nor do they look at whether or not the degree of dependence on remittances matters for recipients’ 
labour market positioning (Tchaidze and Torosyan, 2010, Gerber and Torosyan, 2010). Furthermore, 
few or no empirical studies exist which show the relations between remittances, on the one hand, an 
inflation rates, educational attainment, health status, and inequality levels, on the other. A few existing 
studies could be also affected by the selection bias problem, which means that an effect attributed to 
remittances might stem from other individual and household characteristics, making recipients 
incomparable to non-recipients. This report tries to take into account these shortcomings in compiling 
available studies and data on remittances in Georgia and, at the same time, generates new empirical 
evidence for remittances.  
The report is structured as follows. In the next section the data, variables and methodology of the 
study are described. Section 3 distinguishes three stages in modern migration trends and outlines their 
implications for remittances in Georgia. This is followed by the analysis of quantitative and qualitative 
trends in remittances since the mid 1990s, particularly emphasising the profiles of remitters and 
receivers of remittances. Section 5 studies the links of remittances with the various dimensions of 
development. Subsection 5.1 looks at economic growth, its driving factors and empirical evidence on 
the effect of remittances in this process; subsection 5.2 looks at how investments and financial sector 
development are associated with remittances; in Subsection 5.3 employment and unemployment trends 
and characteristics are related to remittances; Subsection 5.4 studies whether or not remittances play 
any role in inflationary processes; Subsection 5.5 tests how educational and health related 
characteristics are linked to remittances; in Subsection 5.6 associations are investigated between 
various measures of poverty and inequality and remittances. Last but not least, Section 6 is partially 
based on the derived findings. Here we speculate about public moral hazard, informalised welfare and 
policy traps, all stemming from remittances. Each substantive subsection of the report has two main 
sections: the first describing the general conditions and trends regarding an investigated topic, the 
second part bringing forward already available studies or generating new empirical evidence within 
the scope of the project.  
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2. Research design  
This report uses various data sources and eclectic methodological approach to address the impact of 
remittances. More specifically we look at the impact on: growth, investment, financial development, 
employment, inflation, human capital formation, poverty, income inequality, public moral hazard, 
informalised welfare and policy traps. Because there is little if any empirical analysis available on 
some of the outlined issues, the report is based on a first-hand analysis of accessible datasets. Using 
various data sources increases our understanding of the role of remittances in the development of 
Georgia, but it also, of course, has its shortcomings. At the macro level, remittances are defined as part 
of the balance of payment and also crudely estimated by money transfer payments. However at the 
micro level, remittances are represented as the money received from family members, relatives, or 
friends living in another country. Using different definitions and data-sources inevitably affects the 
consistency of findings. However, this is a necessary compromise, the cost of having an empirically 
grounded analysis of various aspects of remittances.  
2.1 Statistical data 
Georgia is characterized by reasonably good coverage of statistical data on remittances. At the macro 
level the National Bank of Georgia (NBG) provides annual, quarterly and monthly statistics on 
remittances by country of origin and by the transfer systems used (NBG, 2012). From 2010 these data 
also includes information from all financial institutions. To facilitate comparisons with other countries, 
data from the World Bank’s Migration and Remittances Database is employed (World Bank, 2012a). 
Other macroeconomic variables such as monthly and annual figures on overall economic growth and 
in different sectors are available through the National Statistics Office of Georgia. These include: 
employment/unemployment, active and inactive population, inflation, aggregate consumption, 
investments and financial sector development, relative poverty levels and households income 
composition, (Geostat, 2012). NBG also provides data on deposits and loans at the commercial banks, 
as well as currency rates. For regional poverty levels data from Working Group on Poverty Reduction 
and Employment (2009) is used. For social assistance levels across regions data from Social Service 
Agency is employed (SSA, 2012), while data on dual Citizenship comes from Civil Registry Agency 
(Gugushvili, 2012b).  
At the micro level, two Life in Transition Surveys (EBRD), 2006 and 2010, the nationally 
representative probabilistic samples of the adult population of Georgia, contain information on 
remittances in the overall household income structure. Here and with other surveys, this report has the 
following definition for a household in receipt of remittances: namely, a respondent asked to list all 
sources of monetary income in her/his household in the last 12 months mentions ‘Money from family 
members, relatives, or friends living in another country’ as one of the sources. For longitudinal 
developments, the CRRC (Caucasus Research Resource Centers, 2009, 2010) dataset is more 
appropriate because it provides information on remittances since the late 2000s, allowing us to look at 
the evolution of remittances in income composition. The summative data from the EBRD’s 2007 
National Public Opinion Survey on Remittances in Georgia is also available (EBRD, 2007) and is used 
for descriptive purposes. The data from the ‘Georgia on the Move’ Survey (GOTM) which was 
conducted as part of a six-country study of the relations between migration and development – the 
Development on the Move Project – is also utilised (IPPR, 2010). Considering complications related 
to data on remittances in general and in the Georgian context in particular, this study interprets data 
very cautiously. Other micro data which are employed in the analysis include the EU Survey by 
CRRC (Caucasus Research Resource Centers, 2011b) and the Survey of South Caucasus by Bendixen 
and Associates (2007).  
2.2 Methodology  
In addition to synthesising and illustrating the existing findings from the available scholarly sources, 
the report employs several complementary methodological approaches. For the macro-economic part 
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of the study with the links between the growth of remittances, on the one hand, and the growth of 
economic output, inflation, and bank deposits on the other, ordinary least squares (OLS) models and 
long series of monthly and quarterly data are used. The role of remittances in relation to the foreign 
direct investment, official development assistance, exports, current account balance, GDP, sectoral 
growth, annual growth rates, employment and unemployment, consumer price index, average annual 
inflation, households’ consumption structure, Gini coefficients, poverty measures, regional 
distribution of poverty, rate of social assistance beneficiaries, and the number of granted citizenships is 
analysed though basic bivariate correlation or the description of overtime changes in these variables. 
Although, this type of analysis cannot reflect the causal effects deriving from remittances, it is useful 
for making tentative conclusions. 
In terms of micro-data, the report is based on statistical analysis of the aforementioned individual and 
household level surveys. As the surveys ask households whether or not they receive remittances, they 
provide an opportunity to investigate statistically significant characteristics associated with remittances. 
On the one hand, the report detects what demographic and socio-economic factors correlate with the 
propensity to receive remittances. On the other, we ask what type of behaviour and conditions there are 
associated with remittances in terms of savings, employment, unemployment, consumption, health, 
education, poverty, inequality and social assistance. Conditioned by the nature of dependent and 
independent variables, the analysis uses two main regression techniques, ordinary least squares and 
linear probability models, to explore how remittances associate with various dependent variables. 
However, results from matching and logistic regressions from other studies are also presented. 
Coefficients from linear probability models are similar to marginal effects for logistic regressions, but 
the former are easier to estimate and interpret (Bernardi and Cebolla, 2011). To account for 
heteroskedasticity in regressions robust standard errors are estimated (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009). 
However, because of space constraints these are not shown in presented tables and figures. Last but not 
least, the regressions are run for Tbilisi, other urban, and rural areas sample separately, and we 
distinguish when remittance are the main versus other source of income for a household.  
3. Emigration from georgia and its links to remittances  
Approximate estimates suggest that Georgia has lost about 20 per cent of its 1989 population to 
migration (Caucasus Research Resource Centres, 2007). Indeed, in 2011, more than 50 percent of 
respondents in a representative social survey reported at least one family member or close friend living 
abroad (Caucasus Research Resource Centers, 2011a). Although migration has intensified, since the 
1990s, it is by no means a new phenomenon for Georgia. Already in the 1920s, the natural increase of 
population in rural areas was high, leading to an imbalance between supply and demand in local 
labour markets: this led, especially in the mountainous regions with scarce arable land, to migration to 
Russia (IOM, 2003). During the decades of Soviet rule Georgia experienced the centrally-channelled 
immigration of Russian-speakers, determined by economic and political considerations, including the 
deliberate attempt to change the ethnic population structure. From the 1970s the immigration of 
Russians into the South Caucasus slowed and was gradually reversed. In 1979-1988, Georgia lost 
about 15% of its Russian population (Korobkov, 2007). As seen in Figure 1, the initial and most 
intense emigration wave from independent Georgia was related to previous trends and lasted until the 
middle of 1990s. In 1997-2003, the negative net migration was maintained but the number of 
emigrants more than halved, probably as a result of the political and economic stabilisation of the 
country. The most recent migration phase, 2004-2011, coincides with the so-called “the Rose 
Revolution”, when the changes in political, economic and social life became associated with positive 
net migration rates. In addition to the size of migration, the various phases have have divergent 
implications for remittances in Georgia.  
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In spite of high scale migration in the first half of the 1990s there are two reasons why this phase 
might not have lasting consequences for remittance in Georgia. First, a substantial share of migrants 
left the country permanently; among these the ethnic minorities were probably the dominant groups. 
The available data suggest that, after the immediate collapse of the Soviet Union, the ethnic dimension 
explained a good part of emigration trends. There are also indications that emigration trends were 
exacerbated by the rhetoric of the post-communist nationalistic elites, such as alleged statements made 
by the first president of Georgia (Brubaker, 1992). In the mid 1990s, the United Nations survey 
indicated that at least one family member of 35 per cent of the Russian, 32 per cent of the Azerbaijani 
and 28 per cent of Armenian respondents in Georgia had already emigrated permanently. For the 
Georgian respondents, meanwhile, the corresponding figure was only 10 per cent (UN, 1996). Many 
of those who left permanently probably did not have close family members left behind to send 
remittances to. On the other hand, as we will see in the next sections, the probability of sending 
remittances decreases dramatically over time.  
If the initial stages emigration has been mostly explained by the collapse of the Soviet Union and 
the resultant ethnical mismatch, later population movements have been judged to depend more on 
economic factors. From 1996 to 2003, emigration was already related to economic conditions and 
most of the migrants were ethnic Georgians who habitually sent money back to Georgia. For the first 
half of 2000s, the majority of those who migrated were previously unemployed (Asatryan, 2007), 
while females tended to emigrate in larger numbers. The poorer economic conditions stimulated 
migration decisions, but no statistically significant relations were found between individuals’ 
education and their willingness to emigrate. Overall, in the first half of the 2000s employment was the 
most common purpose of emigration (Dermendzhieva, 2011). Highly educated individuals, it 
transpired, had up to a four times higher probability of emigration to a high-income OECD country. 
For the nature of remittances it is important to understand the profile of migrants and their destination 
countries. According to the last census of the population of Georgia, 78 percent of absent emigrants 
were abroad so as to improve the economic position of their family; only 10 percent were employed 
before leaving. Emigrants were represented by both sexes (58.7 percent were males) and by a fairly 
young population: over 80 percent were people of working age, while one quarter of migrants were 
tertiary educated (Badurashvili, 2009). 
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Table 1. Migrant stock from Georgia in 10 major destination countries in the first half of 2000s 
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Thousands 629.0 95.7 71.7 70.1 30.2 17.5 12.6 12.0 6.5 90.4 1035.7 
Percent 60.7 9.2 6.9 6.8 2.9 1.7 1.2 1.2 0.6 8.7 100.0 
Source: Migration DRC (2007) 
After the so-called “the Rose Revolution” emigration trends slightly reversed with positive net 
migration rates in some years. This might indicate that, in recent years, the net emigration rates did not 
substantially change, and, therefore, that the size of remittances apparently remained stable. The 2006 
migration survey of 329 returnees and 677 families with at least one household member abroad 
revealed that over 60 percent of current and former migrants were married with children. At the same 
time, well educated women from Georgia were more likely to migrate to the Western European and 
North American destinations, while the typical migrant to the non-EU member former Soviet Union 
countries was married, less educated and a middle-aged man (Badurashvili, 2009). Among the most 
important determinants of temporary emigration, were: age, a negative impact of university education 
and rather low family attachments (Danzer and Dietz, 2009). There is no good data on the population 
distribution of emigrants from Georgia in destination countries. The Development and Research 
Centre on Migration, Globalisation, and Poverty in Table 1 provides national-census-based migrants’ 
stock data from most countries of the world but compiled data refer to the beginning of 2000s and 
might be characterised, though, by some major shortcomings. An alternative approach for estimating 
the main destination countries of Georgian migrants might be the EU Survey by the Caucasus 
Research Resource Centers (2011b). This survey includes questions in a representative sample on the 
countries that they or their family members have visited since 1993 (Figure 2). Both of these methods 
indicate that Russia and Ukraine, as the main destination countries in the former Soviet Union, while 
among Western destinations Germany, Greece, and the US are dominate.  
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To summarise the available evidence, migrants initially were motivated by ethnic and political 
concerns, while from the mid 1990s emigration has been increasingly determined by unemployment 
and decreasing living standards. Arguably, this is the phase when remittances started to become an 
important component in the socio-economic life of Georgia and data on remittances become available 
for the country. The profile of migrants – working age population, married, with children, unemployed 
in Georgia, with lower educational levels, coming from the poorer households – indicates that 
emigration would, naturally, have a strong association with remittance as household members left 
behind almost certainly required financial help from migrants. It is reasonable to argue that emigration 
is strongly associated with remittance waves. At the same time, emigration not only determines 
remittances but also that remittances might affect emigration, and, therefore, lead to further 
remittances. Data from the Caucasus Barometer in Figure 3 show that that those respondents who live 
in the rural households in which remittances represent the main source of income are 40 and 50 
percent more likely to consider temporary and permanent emigration. This effect is also strong in 
urban areas, where remittance reception increased emigration intentions by about 20 percent.  
4. Trends in remittances 
This section describes three alternative estimates of the inflow of remittances in Georgia and notes 
how they change over time. The macro level trends stem from the National Bank of Georgia and the 
World Bank’s Migration and Remittances Database. Data on remittances entering Georgia through 
various money transfer systems are also provided by the National Bank of Georgia. However, note 
that these cannot reflect the full size of remittances to Georgia. Last but not least, a valuable method in 
estimating the volume of remittances is their distribution across households, something which can be 
studied via representative social surveys. This type of date also allow us to describe the profile of 
remittance senders and receivers: this is important in understanding the developmental consequences 
of remittances in Georgia.  
4.1 Macro-level data on remittance  
The National Bank of Georgia provides statistics on its current account within the balance of payments 
of the country. The current account is comprised of goods, services, income and current transfers. Two 
items from the current transfers – workers' remittances and other personal transfers – can be 
considered the official volume of remittances that have flowed into Georgia in 1995-2011. Table 2 
illustrates the dynamics of changes in transfers across the years. In absolute terms, personal 
remittances have increased from 46.8 to 1175.3 million dollars. In 2011 workers’ remittances and 
other personal transfers were almost equally matched, the former accounting for 51.7 percent, while 
the later 48.3 percent of transfers. The highest growth in remittances took place in 2004 when the new 
government came to power and before the Russo-Georgian war in 2008. The growth in transfer 
volumes was caused particularly by workers’ remittances. After a slight decline in growth, 2009-2010, 
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in 2011 workers’ remittances and other personal transfers increased by, respectively, 46.2 and 11.7 
percent. On the other hand, sending remittances from Georgia is a marginal factor in absolute as well 
as relative terms. Due to methodological differences NBG data on remittances are slightly higher than 
those provided by the World Bank. For instance, according to the World Bank’s migration and 
remittance database remittances stood at 806.1 million USD in 2010, while the NBG figure for that 
year was 12.8 percent higher and reached 924.2 million USD.  
Workers’ remittances and the compensation of employees comprises of current transfers by 
migrant workers and wages and salaries earned by non-resident workers. Data are the sum of three 
items defined in the fifth edition of the IMF's Balance of Payments Manual: workers’ remittances, 
compensation of employees, and migrants’ transfers. Although the volume of remittances has been 
growing every year since 2001, so has the size of GDP, which meant that the share of remittance 
stabilised at 5-7 percent, 2001-2010. Two main trends are worth noting here. First, the volume of 
remittances decreased, 1999-2001, probably as a consequence of Russian financial crisis and a stricter 
visa regime introduced for Georgian citizens by that country in 2000 (Mataradze and Mühlfried, 
2009). Second, remittances, and their relative share in GDP, started to grow, 2005-2007. One of the 
reasons for this was the liberalisation of the economy and proactive citizenship policies conducted by 
the new Georgian government (Gugushvili, 2012b). As a consequence of the 2008 economic 
slowdown in the main destination countries for Georgian migrants – e.g. the Russian Federation, 
Ukraine and Greece –remittances grew in nominal terms only by 5.3 percent. This was a lower rate 
than the nominal growth of GDP. However, already in 2009, in spite of the reduction of their absolute 
volumes, remittances again increased to 6.6 percent as a share of GDP because of even stronger 
contractions in the Georgian economy.  
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Table 2. Remittances based on the Balance of Payments statistics, 1995-2011, million current USD 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
(1) +(2) Personal 
remittances  
                 
Net 46.8 32.3 179.7 211.1 174.6 142.2 157.9 170.8 156.9 221.8 258.7 384.1 550.0 695.4 826.5 924.2 1175 
Growth (%) n/a -31.1 456.8 17.5 -17.3 -18.5 11.0 8.2 -8.2 41.4 16.6 48.5 43.2 26.4 18.9 11.8 27.2 
Credit 46.8 32.3 179.7 211.1 197.0 147.4 163.0 175.7 166.3 233.7 272.0 395.5 561.4 712.8 838.3 951.1 1191 
Debit 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -22.5 -5.2 -5.0 -4.9 -9.5 -11.9 -13.3 -11.4 -11.5 -17.4 -11.7 -26.9 -15.2 
(1) Workers' 
remittances                  
Net 0.0 0.0 103.1 137.3 127.1 61.5 73.6 72.6 58.8 56.6 86.2 149.1 243.3 302.7 315.8 415.3 607.1 
Growth (%)  n/a n/a n/a 33.1 -7.4 -51.6 19.6 -1.4 -19.0 -3.8 52.4 73.0 63.2 24.4 4.3 31.5 46.2 
Credit 0.0 0.0 103.1 137.3 149.5 64.0 75.7 74.7 64.5 64.0 93.8 153.0 245.0 305.1 317.4 416.6 608.0 
Debit 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -22.5 -2.5 -2.0 -2.1 -5.7 -7.4 -7.6 -3.8 -1.7 -2.4 -1.5 -1.3 -0.8 
(2) Other personal 
transfers                  
Net 46.8 32.3 76.6 73.8 47.5 80.7 84.3 98.2 98.1 165.2 172.5 235.0 306.6 392.7 510.7 508.9 568.2 
Growth (%) n/a -31.1 137.3 -3.6 -35.6 69.8 4.5 16.5 -0.1 68.5 4.4 36.2 30.5 28.1 30.1 -0.4 11.7 
Credit 46.8 32.3 76.6 73.8 47.5 83.4 87.3 101.0 101.9 169.7 178.2 242.6 316.4 407.6 520.9 534.5 582.5 
Debit 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -2.7 -3.0 -2.8 -3.8 -4.5 -5.7 -7.6 -9.8 -15.0 -10.2 -25.6 -14.3 
 
Source: NBG (2012) 
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Statistics on electronic money transfers made from foreign countries to Georgia can be an illustrative 
measure of the most recent developments in the volumes and origin of remittances. These data include 
two main sources of electronic transfers: (a) Money transfers to bank accounts of recipients; and (b) cash 
transfer systems via Western Union, Unistream, Intel Express and the like. It is difficult to distinguish 
what part of bank account transfers are remittances, but transfers to personal accounts rather than 
business accounts are more likely to be remittances. On the other hand, cash transfer systems are more 
likely to be utilised as a means of sending remittances in Georgia, and this is particularly so for poor and 
rural migrants, who are unlikely to have bank accounts (Welton, 2009b). Data on cash transfers is 
provided by the NBG (2012) and is disaggregated by months, after July 1999, countries of origin and 
payment systems. There is a significant growth in cash-transfers in the second half of 2000s. This may 
indicate that the real volume of remittances increased, or, more likely, that the cost of transferring money 
electronically dropped substantially so that more people began sending remittances with this method 
than before (Welton, 2009a). After 2010 NBG includes in cash transfer systems statistics information 
derived from micro-financial organisations, which are eligible to perform money transfers. Therefore, the 
latest developments in remittances can be estimated through this type of data, while the overtime 
changes can be better analysed through the balance of payments’ statistics.  
Figure 5 shows how the volume of electronic transfers changed from the first quarter of 2008 to the 
second quarter of 2012. There has been significant increase in quarterly volumes of remittances in 
2010 especially for the second and third quarters. This continued through 2011. For the first months of 
2012 remittances declined, which is typical for the first quarter, and then increased again. The share of 
remittances in total output remained within a 4.5-5.5 percent margin. In contrast to total remittances, 
the share of electronic transfers increased, 2008-2012. Electronic transfers are also helpful in 
highlighting the top remittance-sending destinations. Table 3 lists 10 major sending countries to 
Georgia: Russia, the USA, Italy, Greece, Ukraine, Turkey, Spain, Germany, the UK, and Kazakhstan. 
This list, with some exceptions, coincides with the distribution of the Georgian migrants reviewed in 
the previous section. Together they account for about 90 percent of all monetary transfers. The 
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Russian Federation accounts for more than a half of all electronic transfers made, but its share has 
been decreasing from 63 percent since 2008. On the other hand, the share of transfers from the USA 
increased from 4.7 to 11.5 percent. Remittances from Italy also increased almost two times over, but 
decreased in Greece.  
Table 3. Money transfers from ten major countries, millions of current USD 
  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 (8 months) 
 Mln. USD 
Share in 
total 
Mln. 
USD 
Share in 
total 
Mln. 
USD 
Share in 
total 
Mln. 
USD 
Share in 
total 
Mln. 
USD 
Share in 
total 
Russia 633.9 63.3 450.4 53.5 555.6 52.8 655.2 51.7 450.8 52.5 
USA 47.2 4.7 60.4 7.2 103.8 9.9 144.6 11.4 98.9 11.5 
Italy  36.6 3.7 46.3 5.5 76.7 7.3 109.2 8.6 69.6 8.1 
Greece 63.9 6.4 68.1 8.1 75.3 7.2 75.3 5.9 51.4 6.0 
Ukraine 70.5 7.0 65.1 7.7 59.0 5.6 52.4 4.1 29.9 3.5 
Turkey 20.9 2.1 25.9 3.1 33.6 3.2 27.6 2.2 19.5 2.3 
Spain 20.4 2.0 21.3 2.5 27.3 2.6 31.0 2.4 18.7 2.2 
Germany 8.3 0.8 6.2 0.7 13.5 1.3 14.9 1.2 12.1 1.4 
UK 8.4 0.8 9.0 1.1 12.1 1.1 14.4 1.1 9.2 1.1 
Kazakhstan 10.4 1.0 7.8 0.9 9.9 0.9 26.2 2.1 7.0 0.8 
All 10 countries 920.5 91.9 760.5 90.3 966.7 91.9 1150.9 90.8 767.1 89.3 
Source: NBG (2012) 
There have been some important changes in terms of money transfer system in recent years. The 
Western Union which, in 2009, accounted for a quarter of all money transfers saw its market share 
shrink to 14 percent in the first eight months of 2012. Other large transfer systems include Zolotaia 
Korona and Unistream accounting for 20 and 17 percent of electronic transfers in 2012. In remittance-
sending industry the companies frequently use various marketing tools to attract new customers, but 
the main mode of competition is pricing models such as economy of scale, standard percent and 
special corridor pricing (Jgamadze and Markarashvili, 2009). 
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 4.2 Remittances in household level surveys  
Statistics on remittances most likely do not capture the whole story related to remittances and their 
nature. It is well established that official money transfer services have to compete with a very large 
informal sector (Guruli, 2012). It is known that many migrants are likely to send remittances through 
couriers, acquaintances, and friends travelling back to Georgia. They tend to consider this form of 
transfer as the most convenient and reliable. At the same time, remittances also might include goods 
and household appliances, which are brought upon return rather than sent home through various 
channels (Badurashvili, 2009). According to the 2007 Georgia’s National Public Opinion Survey on 
Remittances most transfers take place via the formal money transfer systems. But informal channels, 
such as a courier or a family member travelling to or from Georgia accounted for nearly one third of 
transactions. Figure 7 shows that informal remittances appear to be higher in rural areas than in urban 
areas, which can probably be explained with the undeveloped financial infrastructure in rural Georgia 
(Jgamadze and Markarashvili, 2009). One way to better address the scope and scale of remittances 
might be the individual/household level surveys. Because these surveys generally inquire about 
already received transfers, they show us the share of remittance-recipient households, from all 
channels, and the amount of received transfers across recipient households. Both of these variables are 
instrumental in understanding the dynamics of remittances and their impact on development.  
Table 4 presents descriptive statistics on the share of households receiving remittances from 
abroad, 2006-2010. Three different micro-level datasets indicate that the spread of remittances varies 
between 8.3-14.3 percent of all households. This share remained stable in the second half of 2000s. At 
the same time residents in the capital are most likely, while those from rural backgrounds are least 
likely to receive remittances. Considering that the volume of remittances increased over the same time 
period, it can be concluded that roughly constant numbers of households received higher volumes of 
remittances. We estimate that the average monthly remittances received by households was as high as 
265 GEL (Geostat, 2012). This figure derives by using information available from the Georgian 
Statistical Agency on monthly remittances for an average Georgian household. Then using CBS for 
2009-10, the average size of Georgian households is calculated. The division of Georgian population 
by the average size of its household members, allows us to extrapolate the average monthly 
remittances for those 11 percent of households which received remittances in Georgia. These 
calculations are close to those derived by the EBRD for 2006 which estimated the size of monthly 
remittances at around 189 GEL (EBRD, 2007). These calculations are also close to figures derived 
from Development of the Move dataset, which estimated 219 GEL monthly remittances in 2008. Table 
5 also shows that the scale of remittance varies substantially according to the countries of residence of 
remitters. North American residents send the highest amounts. This explains why relatively low stocks 
of migrants in the US account for the second highest share of electronic transfers. Almost 300 GEL 
extra each month can positively affect many aspects of household behaviour. These outside 
contributions might also generate adverse incentives on individual and public levels. These issues are 
addressed latter in the report.  
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Table 4. Prevalence of remittances in households in Georgia 
 Datasets 
 LITS  
2006 
CBS  
2007 
GOTM 
2008 
CBS  
2009 
CBS  
2010 
Share of households reporting ‘income from relatives 
and friends abroad’ as one of the sources of income  10.3 8.6 14.3 11.2 11.0 
Of which, rural settlements 4.6 10.5 12.5 9.6 8.7 
Of which, urban settlements 13.2 7.3 21.6 13.2 12.7 
Of which, Tbilisi 16.4 8.3 18.5 11.5 14.4 
Sample size of the survey  1000 3306 1500 1791 1951 
Notes and sources: LITS=Life in Transition Survey (2006); CBS=Caucasus Barometer(2009, 2010); GOTH=Development of 
the Move (2008) 
Table 5. Remitted amounts by sending countries (GEL) 
 Russia Greece Western Europe 
Other non-
FSU Turkey 
Other 
FSU 
North 
America 
Number of observations 50 34 30 10 9 8 5 
Mean monthly transfers 154.6 179.8 161.9 261.7 111.1 192.2 299.2 
Standard deviation 178.5 125.5 173.0 168.5 148.3 183.5 336.0 
Source: Georgia of the Move Survey (2008) 
4.3 Who sends and who receives remittances?  
The first step in understanding the impact of remittances on development is to define who sends and 
who receives remittances. This is a complicated task because most of the surveys are not able to 
adequately capture the characteristics of absent migrants. Georgia on the Move Survey for 2008 is one 
of the few sources which asked respondents in Georgia detailed questions about their kin or other 
family-related emigrants. This can provide us with a profile of the typical remittance sender. Table 6 
shows that 72.2 per cent of migrant groups remitted to their households in 2008, but the probability of 
remitting is negatively associated with the size of the migrant group. More frequent contacts between 
the migrant group and the household also facilitates the probability of remitting. Migrants who leave 
children behind are more likely to remit back. If the recipient household is located in a rural area then 
the probability of sending remittances to that household is higher. Residency in Western Europe, 
North America and Turkey is also positively related to the probability of remitting. The duration of 
stay abroad is an important factor and has a curvilinear association with the probability of remitting. 
The third year of stay provides higher expectation of remitting to Georgia, but this effect diminishes 
with a longer duration of stay. More educated emigrants are much more likely to send remittances. 
Last but not least, employment status strongly determines a migrant’s ability to remit. Furthermore, if 
migrants have a job arranged before emigration then they are more likely to remit (Tchaidze and 
Torosyan, 2010).  
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Table 6. Characteristics of remitting migrant groups 
Characteristic  % of remitting Characteristic % of remitting 
Percent of migrants who remit 72.2 Urban 73.9 
Size of group in migration  Tbilisi 69.7 
1 person 76.8 Destination  
2 person 76.2 Greece  65.8  
3 person 61.2 North America  73.1  
4 person 56.3 Russia  59.7  
Frequency of contacts  Turkey  82.9  
Never 18.2 Western Europe  89.4  
Less than once a year 22.1 Other FSU  71.4  
More than once a year 27.9 Other  75.4  
More than once every 6 months 36.1 Duration in migration   
More than once every 3 months 36.8 Less than 1 year in migration  58.9  
Monthly 79.9 1-3 years in migration  72.5  
More than once a month 63.1 3-6 years in migration  83.9  
Weekly 78.8 6-10 years in migration  81.6  
More than once a week 87.1 10-16 years in migration  53.1  
Children in Georgia not in HH  HMG education before migration   
No 74.3 Primary education  21.4  
Yes 51.7 Secondary education  69.4  
Children in Georgia in HH  Higher education  78.0  
No children 60.2 HMG job status   
1 child 91.7 No Full-time job  54.7  
2 children 90.8 Full-time job  78.4  
3 children 100.0 Job not fixed before migration  69.5  
Settlement type  Job fixed before migration  85.1  
Rural 72.8   
Notes: HH=household, HMG: Households with migrants. Source: Tchaidze and Torosyan (2010) 
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After reviewing a remittance senders’ typical profile we can now describe the profiles of recipient 
households. For this purpose data from the Development on the Move Survey, the EBRD’s Georgia 
National Public Opinion Survey on Remittances, and the Caucasus Barometer for 2009-2010 are 
employed. Table 7 shows the distribution of respondents in recipient and non-recipient household 
according to demographic and socio-economic variables. Once again, the probability of receiving 
remittances is negatively associated with residency in rural areas. If non-recipient rural households 
make up 46.3 percent of the overall settlement distribution, rural settlements’ share among recipient 
households is 37.1 percent. In terms of age distribution of recipients, youth aged 18-24 and adults aged 
50-64 are slightly overrepresented among recipient households (Caucasus Research Resource Centers, 
2010). The latter characteristics is also in line with the findings from EBRD’s Georgia National Public 
Opinion Survey on Remittances (EBRD, 2007), which shows that youth are overrepresented, while the 
elderly are underrepresented among remittance recipients. Related to that is the finding that 
remittances are negatively associated with the number of retirees in families and the number of male 
adults. The probability of getting remittances decreases by 4-6 per cent for each additional adult 
household member. Apparently, among recipient households slightly more than half get remittances 
from absent household members and another half from non-members (Tchaidze and Torosyan, 2010). 
The least educated are significantly under-represented, while the most educated are over-
represented among recipient households. Employment status seems to be one of the most significant 
variables which distinguishes recipient from non recipient households. Distribution is 11.0 percentage 
points higher among employed respondents in non-recipient households. The distribution of recipient 
households is much higher among the unemployed who are looking for a job. The chances of being 
among recipient households are also higher for housewives, disabled and the unemployed who are not 
looking for a job (Caucasus Research Resource Centers, 2010). Non-recipients are much more likely 
to be at the bottom of income distribution with less than 101 USD monthly income in 2009-10. On the 
other hand, households with 251-800 USD income are more likely to be recipients. The regional 
distribution of remittance recipients does not coincide with the population’s regional distribution. 
Households in Samtskhe-Javakheti, Samegrelo-Zemo Svaneti, and Imereti have the higher probability 
of being recipients with respectively 4, 3 and 1 percent higher share of remittance distribution, while 
Adjara and Shida Kartli have much lower share of recipient households than their share in the overall 
household distribution. Those households with at least one return migrant are much more likely to get 
remittances. Last but not least, ethnic minorities are more likely to receive remittances than ethnically 
Georgian households. This is particularly true for the Armenian minority which represents about 4 
percent in terms of household distribution, but 26 percent among recipient households. Interestingly, 
families which reside in voting districts with the higher emigration rates are themselves more likely to 
receive remittances.2
                                                     
2 This might happen via neighboring families.  
 The chance of receiving remittances is also higher for more religious households, 
where the number of under aged children is higher (Gerber and Torosyan, 2010).  
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Table 7. Demographic, socio-economic and settlement characteristics of remittance recipient  
and non-recipient households  
Characteristics 
(1) Non 
recip. 
HH 
(2) 
Recip. 
HH 
(2)-(1) 
Differe. Characteristics 
(1) Non 
recip. 
HH 
(2) 
Recip. 
HH 
(2)-(1) 
Differe. 
Gender of recipients     Monthly household 
income 
   
Male 43.7 42.5 –1.2 Less than 50 USD 14.4 8.4 –6.0 
Female 56.3 57.5  1.2 51 to 100 USD 33.1 29.0 –4.1 
Settlement type    101 to 250 USD 30.8 32.0  1.2 
Rural  46.3 37.1 –9.2 251 to 400 USD 13.6 17.0  3.4 
Urban 31.3 37.1  5.8 401 to 800 USD 5.8 12.0  6.2 
Capital 22.4 25.8  3.4 801 to 1200 USD 1.7 1.7  0.0 
Age groups     More than 1200 USD 0.8 0 –0.8 
Age 18-24 9.6 10.4  0.8 Regions of Georgia     
Age 25-34 15.6 13.8 –1.8 Guria 3.0 3.0  0.0 
Age 35-49 25.4 24.0 –1.4 Mtskheta Mtianeti 3.0 3.0  0.0 
Age 50-64 26.3 29.5  3.2 Shida Kartli 7.0 5.0 –2.0 
Age 65+ 23.2 22.3 –0.9 Adjara 9.0 6.0 –3.0 
Level of education    Kakheti 9.0 8.0 –1.0 
Did not complete 
secondary sch. 
12.7 8.91 –3.8 Samtskhe Javakheti 5.0 9.0  4.0 
Completed secondary 
school 
33.3 37.1  3.8 Kvemo Kartli 12.0 11.0 –1.0 
Some university or 
technical sch. 
26.2 24.8 –1.4 Samegrelo-Zemo 
Svaneti 
11.0 14.0  3.0 
University graduate or 
more 
27.8 29.2  1.4 Imereti 16.0 17.0  1.0 
Employment status    Tbilisi 25.0 24.0 –1.0 
Employed 32.6 21.6 –11.0 Ethnicity     
Unempl. and looking 
for a job 
23.2 28.1  4.9 Georgians 88.2 62.7 -25.5 
Unempl. and not 
looking for a job 
6.5 7.5  1.0 Azerbaijanis 6.1 6.3 0.2 
Students 2.1 3.0  0.9 Armenians 3.7 26.0 22.3 
Housewives 9.1 11.6  2.5 Other ethnicities 0.8 2.7 1.9 
Retired 23.1 24.0  0.9 Russians 0.7 1.9 1.2 
Disabled and other  3.5 4.6  1.1 Other Caucasian 
ethnicities 
0.6 0.5 -0.1 
Notes: HH=Household. Source: Caucasus Research Resource Centers (2010), European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (2007)  
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 5. The development and side effects of remittances in georgia  
5.1 Remittances and growth 
There is no conclusive evidence in economic and developmental literature that remittances have a 
positive effect on economic growth. Some studies find positive associations (Pradhan et al., 2008, 
Siddique et al., 2012), but others reveal little or even negative evidence that remittance affect growth 
rates in receiving countries (Barajas et al., 2009, Chami et al., 2005). These studies as a rule use cross-
national comparisons and employ macro-level data, while single country studies, like the current 
report, are relatively rare and are more difficult to conduct (see Siddique et al., 2012).  
Economic growth, its driving factors and possible links with remittances  
Georgia’s economic performance was relatively successful in the post 2003 “Rose Revolution” period, 
prior to 2008. In this period reforms implemented by the government were associated with 9 percent 
average annual GDP growth rates, which shrank as a consequence of the double shocks of the world 
financial crisis and the Russian-Georgian confrontation over South Ossetia. As shown in Figure 8, 
growth was driven by selected sectors such as trade services, construction, financial intermediation 
and manufacturing.3
  
 Agriculture retained the fourth and first position in, respectively, total output and 
employment, but experienced overall decline, 2003-2010. In this list the most relevant sector in terms 
of remittances’ impact, might be the growth in trade services which was largely the result of high 
domestic demand (World Bank, 2009). At the same time, because imports account for a higher share 
of locally consumed goods, trade is excessively dependant on external transactions. The share of trade 
and other related activities in GDP increased to more than 17 percent in 2010 and became the biggest 
sector in the economy. It was also one of the driving factors of economic growth in 2003-2010, 
increasing by 169 percent in nominal prices, along with expansion of public administration, financial 
intermediation, social, educational and healthcare services. Economic growth should be affected by 
remittances as an average “migrodollar” recipient household is estimated to spend approximately 80 
percent of its monetary income on consumption (Kakulia, 2007). 
 
 
                                                     
3 Agriculture as the biggest employer in Georgia has experience volatile growth rates because of Russia’s sanctions and 
negligence from the government. 
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Table 8. Remittance and current account balance in Georgia 1998-2010 
(in millions of current $US) 
 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 
Remittances, paid   10.6  25.7  25.9  28.4  50.2 
Remittances, received   372.9  181.3  303.2  695.5  806.1 
Foreign direct investment, net inflows  265.3  109.8  492.3  1750.2  816.7 
Net official development assist. and official aid  208.5  291.4  313.4  380.1  625.2 
Net trade in goods  -694.6  -506.8  -915.6  -2895.8  -2586.3 
Current account balance  -275.7  -198.1  -354.4  -2009.4  -1196.6 
Source: Word Bank (2012) 
Remittances directly influence the central domains of Georgia’s economy as one of the main 
sources of foreign exchange and national reserves (EPRC, 2011). Table 5 shows that, by 2010, the size 
of FDI and remittances was almost equal and the former remains the main source to mitigate a high 
negative current account balance. While it is often argued that FDI are one, if not the most important 
factors of growth (Gürsoy and Kalyoncu, 2012), much less emphasis is placed on remittances. The 
impact on economic growth stems primarily from consumer goods as recipients spent more than 80% 
of the remittances on food, housing, clothing, utilities and medicine. They also contribute to the 
growth of imports because the share of imported goods, industrial and food products, is very high in 
the consumption structure (Branco, 2010). In terms of pro-poor economic growth consequences, 
remittances seem to be favourable in comparison to foreign direct investment because most remittance 
money is spent on the consumption of primary goods and services (Welton, 2009a). Primary 
consumption is thought to generate multiplicative effect for goods which are produced locally and 
might, therefore, stimulate pro-poor growth. On the other hand, FDIs in Georgia are mainly directed to 
industries such as banking, telecommunications and property, which might not generate pro-poor 
growth. In addition, remittances are a more reliable source of foreign revenues to the country than 
FDIs, something amply demonstrated in the 2008 crisis (Welton, 2009a). 
Empirical evidence on the remittances’ effect on growth  
Available data for Georgia do not allow any investigation into direct causal links between remittance 
and growth. But it is reasonable to hypothesise that remittances might have a significant effect on 
growth. Two types of evidence can be drawn on the links between remittances and growth. On the one 
hand, the report of the Center for Social and Economic Research (Atamanov et al., 2009) analyses the 
direct and indirect effects of remittances and the country’s economic performance, using a computable 
general equilibrium (CGE) model and taking into account some of the basic features of the Georgian 
household sector, as well as its macroeconomic and institutional environment. The findings indicate 
that the impact of remittances is strongest on private households’ consumption, but less relevant for 
GDP growth rate. According to this assessment, in the counterfactual scenario of the lack of 
remittances, private consumption and GDP growth rates would decrease by, respectively, 24.7 and 
13.3 percent. Across the different sectors of economy, a simulated hypothetical discontinuation of 
remittances was estimated to have the strongest influence on manufacturing output, –14.9 percent, 
while large-scale agricultural production would be expected to decrease by about 8.7 percent. The 
main conclusion is that remittances have macroeconomic consequences, but that they do not affect all 
sectors symmetrically (Atamanov et al., 2009).  
 
CARIM-East RR 2013/29 © 2013 EUI, RSCAS 17
The Development and the Side Effects of Remittances in the CIS Countries and Georgia: The Case of Georgia
Table 9. Quarterly GDP and remittances growth rates, coefficient from OLS models 
 Dependent variable: GDP quarterly growth rates in 2006-2012 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Remittances growth rate  .61***  .62***  .51*** - 
One quarter lagged remit. growth 
rate - - -  .29 
Time effect  -  .10  .07 -.15 
Quarters - -  3.9**  11.1*** 
Notes: *** denotes statistical significance at the 0.01 level. Robust standard errors have been calculated but are not shown. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the National Bank of Georgia (2012)  
On the other hand, the associative analysis of remittances also shows that a strong correlation exists 
between growth in remittances and economic growth rates. Figure 9 charts annual growth rates in 
remittances along with annual GDP growth rates. The correlation for these two trends is moderate but 
statistically significant, especially after 2005. More rigorous but still simple OLS regression models in 
Table 9 associate quarterly growth rates in remittances with corresponding GDP growth rates (controlling 
for time and quarter effects). Associations between these trends are significant. Still this association does 
not indicate that there is a direct causal impact. Since much of the remittance in Georgia come from 
neighbouring countries, it seems more likely that both growth in remittances and GDP growth are the 
product of broader economic trends in the region and the world. Last but not least, the role of remittances in 
development can also be judged by the consequences of the World Economic Crisis. EBRD’s “Life in 
Transition Survey” for 2010 indicates, however, that the reduced flow of remittances was not a major 
problem for the population of Georgia during the recession. Only 0.9 percent of respondents in the 2010 
representative survey named it as the factor most affected by the crisis.  
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To conclude this section, we can say that there appears to be a strong association between 
economic growth and remittances in Georgia, much of which stems from the confluent economic 
trends in Georgia and remittance sending economies. If there is any direct effect on economic growth, 
it most likely comes via the trade sector which by 2010 became the largest part of the Georgian 
economy. Remittances represent the major source of foreign currency, which helps Georgia to sustain 
its negative trade balance. Nonetheless, the possible links of remittances with economic growth cannot 
only be attributed to the consumption stimulation and multiplier effect, but can also include the effects 
stemming from currency appreciation, inflation, investments and savings, human capital formation, 
employment and unemployment, all these links are discussed in the following sections. 
5.2 Remittances, investment and financial development 
Remittances could lead to better economic outcomes for the country via their effect on savings, 
investment and financial sector development. On the one hand, the effect largely depends on how 
much and by what means remittances are sent, and how recipients utilise transferred resources 
(Kupets, 2012). On the other hand, as noted above, remittances are primarily spent on food and basic 
subsistence needs, housing and sometimes on children’s education. This leaves only a limited space 
for remittances to affect the overall level of savings and investments in the country.  
Investments and the financial sector in Georgia  
The banking system, which is one of the most developed sectors in the Georgian economy 
(representing more than 90% of the financial sector‘s total assets), is the dominant component of the 
financial sector in Georgia. Other constituent parts of the financial sector include insurance companies 
and microfinance institutions. The available data indicates that the total assets in the banking system 
steadily grew in terms of volume and as a share of GDP in the second half of 2000s (Government of 
Georgia, 2011). Without considering the potential effect of remittances, Georgia is characterized by 
low levels of gross national savings. Low incomes and cultural characteristics are possible 
explanations for the observed trends. The financial assets originating from foreign sources other than 
remittances have been identified as crucial component of savings and investments in Georgia. Figure 
11 shows the gradual increase of deposits since 2003, but it lags far behind the growth of loans 
especially post 2007. This means that commercial banks make loans using funds from external 
sources. The savings, in terms of their share in gross national income, have also declined in recent 
years, partially due to the effects of the dual shock of the Russian-Georgian war and the 2008-2009 
Global Financial Crisis (GFC).  
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Evidence from the mid 2000s indicates that financial intermediation through cross sales of products 
to either remittance senders or remittance recipients was almost nonexistent. For the financial sector 
remittances are resources for loan collateral, instruments for the modernisation of the payment 
industry through advanced technologies. Remittances can be a source of asset accumulation, credit 
history and collateralization. The 2009 study revealed that, though attracting remittance recipients was 
one of the main goals of financial institutions, they expressed a concern about a lack of financial 
literacy among customers. One of the major banks in Georgia, TBC Bank, offered bank accounts to all 
clients with a main selling point that international account-to-account transfers could be less expensive 
than transfers through money transfer systems. Revenue received by the money transfer payments 
constituted around 20 percent of the net income of financial institutions in 2008 (Jgamadze and 
Markarashvili, 2009). One of the ways through which remittances might affect investments is the 
development of the real estate sector in Georgia. It has been suggested that a substantial portion of 
remittances is accumulated for investment in real estate. Evidence exist from qualitative studies that 
migrants, after satisfying basic needs for families, begin to accumulate sources for purchasing an 
apartment, preferably in the capital (Zurabishvili, 2007). What part of financial resources intended for 
investment in real estate is transferred and accumulated via remittances and what fraction is brought 
by the return migrants themselves is not known.  
Remittances, savings and investment  
Evidence on the effect of remittances on investment and financial sector development is scarce, 
especially at the macro level. However, individual and household level surveys might indicate some 
sort of relationship between these variables. Table 10 shows how receiving remittances are linked to 
households’ propensity to save. Regression coefficients indicate that when remittances are the primary 
source of household incomes they marginally increase the propensity to save in rural areas (by 6 
percent). However, in urban areas outside Tbilisi receiving remittances as a supplementary source of 
income, increases the chances of saving by 9 percent. Apparently remittances contribute to the higher 
savings among recipients. But it is less clear how these saving are used. Are they kept at home, 
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deposited in bank accounts or invested via other means? The CBS analysis, 2009-2010, indicates that 
remittance recipients do not have different trust relations to banks and financial institutions in 
statistical terms.4
Table 10. Availability of savings in households and remittances, regression coefficients from 
linear probability models 
 Overall, among recipients slightly more than 50 percent trust or fully trust banks, 
while this share is slightly, but insignificantly higher among the general population. Mistrust in the 
banking sector can be seen in the rapid decline of deposits in commercial banks during the war in 
2008. The regression output by Orozco (2007) also shows that those in Georgia who receive 
remittances, especially in higher volumes, have an interest in investing in various assets.  
 
 
Total 
sample Tbilisi 
Urban 
areas 
Rural 
areas 
Dependent variable: Household having savings      
RR households   .04**  .00  .07**  .03 
RR households: the main source  .02 –.03  .04  .06* 
RR households: not the main source  .05***  .07  .09***  .01 
Notes: *** denotes statistical significance at the 0.01 level. Models control for gender, age, education and dummy for 2010. 
Robust standard errors are calculated, not shown. Source: Author’s calculations based on the pooled data from the Caucasus 
Barometer in 2009 and 2010 
In the middle of 2000s the majority of remittance recipients in Georgia collected their 
remittances at a financial institution without the use of a bank account (only about 11 percent of 
remittance recipients had accounts). Recipients in urban areas and higher income brackets were 
much more likely than recipients in rural areas and lower income brackets to have bank accounts. 
The size of remittances also tended to positively associate with a probability of having an account. 
Further, recipients who received remittances were frequently more likely to have a bank account: 40 
percent of those who receive remittances twice a month or more have a bank account but only 2 
percent of those that receive remittances about once a year s (Jgamadze and Markarashvili, 2009). 
Logistic model in table 11 uses bank account ownership as the dependent variable, while the 
independent variables are various remittance-related characteristics most of which are significantly 
and positively associated with the ownership of a bank account. The number of years of receiving 
remittances are negatively associated with the dependent variable. Bendixen and Associates’ survey 
also inquired about links between remittance recipients and recipients’ potential interest in investing 
in some asset building activity such as a mortgage loan or a loan to finance a business. The share of 
remittance recipients who expressed a strong interest in various investment options ranged from 22 
to 40 percent (Orozco, 2007). 
Table 11. Determinants of bank account ownership, coefficients from logit model 
 
 
Dependent variable 
Independent variables 
Assets or 
investments 
Interest in 
investing 
Income  
levels 
Years 
receiving 
Amount 
received 
Bank account ownership 1.67*** .005***  .000*** –.537*** .313*** 
Notes: *** denotes statistical significance at the 0.01 level. Source: Orozco (2007) based on the nationwide survey conducted 
in 2006 
                                                     
4 We use here an ordinal variable “trust banks, financial companies” with answer options from 1 “fully distrust” to 5 “fully 
trust” as the dependent variable, while receiving remittance served as an independent variable. 
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Although it looks like that there is a statistically significant association between remittances, 
savings, bank account ownership and investment intentions, it does not mean that remittances lead to 
higher levels of bank savings and investments at the macro level. To test whether or not remittances 
are associated with the overall levels of saving accounts, monthly growth of deposits is regressed (in 
GEL and other currencies) in commercial banks by the monthly growth of remittances since 2002. 
OLS models did not show any statistically significant association between these two trends. To 
summarise, it is likely that remittances have some effect on financial development and investments in 
Georgia, but the scope of this impact does not seem to be big enough to affect overall saving and 
investment levels in the country.  
5.3 Remittances and employment 
In this section we look at the relationship between remittances and labour market outcomes in 
Georgia. Research from various countries and contexts indicates that the relationship between the two 
is not linear, as remittances may reduce or increase employment depending on the recipient’s 
characteristics: e.g. gender, location, and the type of work and occupation (Amuedo-Dorantes and 
Pozo, 2006).  
Employment and unemployment and possible links with remittances 
In recent years public opinion surveys have continuously named unemployment as the major problem 
facing the country (Navarro and Woodward, 2012). Official unemployment has, since the 1990s, 
stayed continuously at double digit level. Two sharp increases in unemployment were the result of 
public administration reforms in 2004-2006 and the consequences of the economic meltdown post 
2008 (Working Group on Poverty Reduction and Employment, 2009). Furthermore, it has been argued 
that the official unemployment and employment level in Georgia do not reflect the situation on the 
labour market. In the above mentioned public opinion survey 33 percent of interviewed individuals 
claimed to be unemployed and looking for work. One of the main reasons why official unemployment 
rates are lower than individuals’ perceptions is their engagement in subsistence agriculture, which is 
considered to be employment by the official statistics. It is also known that the risk of unemployment 
in Georgia is higher for the young, the better educated (because of ‘educational attainment’ mismatch) 
and residents of urban areas. Women, older people, and individuals with specialized experience, 
meanwhile, suffer longer spells of unemployment (World Bank, 2009). 
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Measuring a direct association between remittances and recipients’ labour market conditions is 
problematic. To start with, the main driving factor for remittances is all too often labour market driven 
emigration intentions and behaviour. This means, of course, that without considering remittances’ 
effects on employment/unemployment consequences, its existence has substantial links with labour-
market development. In a labour market with restricted opportunities of obtaining well-paid jobs 
remittances have the potential to provide a disincentive for recipients to work in two distinct ways: (1) 
remittances can provide easy alternative income and stimulate intentions to not work at all; (2) 
remittances can help individuals to raise the reservation wage which means that they would be more 
likely to look and wait longer for an appropriate job. This line of thought implies that remittances 
increase the probability of unemployment in recipient households (Gerber and Torosyan, 2010). On 
the other hand, in less likely and indirect scenarios, remittances can help recipients to find a job by 
providing resources for job hunting and by allowing human capital investments. The next paragraphs 
presents available evidence on these hypothesised relationships.  
Remittances and labour market outcomes: available empirical evidence 
Using Georgia on the Move dataset, Gerber and Torosyan (2010) find little or no evidence that 
remittances in Georgia are associated with having a small business. Nor do they find evidence that 
remittances associate positively with unemployment. However, when the analysis is split into rural 
and urban samples, some evidence of a positive effect of remittances on small business activity is 
revealed in rural households with an emigrated member. Likewise, in urban areas, there is some 
evidence that remittances facilitate urban unemployment. One of the main shortcoming of the 
presented analysis of migration on the move data is that the authors do not distinguish between those 
households in which remittances play different role in overall composition of incomes. Analysing the 
same data but in a different study, Tchaidze and Torosyan (2010) claim that remittances do not have a 
significant impact on unemployment and employment rates. However, they find that having a migrant 
member or a returned migrant in a household increases the chances that the individual will be in work. 
This is most likely the compositional effect as high levels of unemployment stimulate emigration, 
which in turn leaves households with fewer unemployed members.  
Table 12. The matching estimators of remittance effects on expenditures on owning a business 
and unemployment, average affects of migration on migrant households 
 All Urban 
Households 
All Rural 
households 
Urban AM 
households 
Rural AM 
households 
Owning business in last yr.  .00  .04  .01  .12* 
Anyone unemployed  .03 –.12  .14* –.16 
Notes: *denotes statistically significant effect. AM=Absent migrants. Source: Gerber and Torosyan (2010) 
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To further test remittance impact on labour market outcomes more rigorously, we conducted an 
analysis of the Caucasus Barometer with pooled dataset for 2009-2010. Three dependent variables – 
being unemployed and not looking for a job, being unemployed and looking for a job, and being 
employed – are used. Employment is defined by a positive answer on the following question: ‘Are you 
currently employed? This employment may be part-time or full-time, official, informal, or self-
employment, but it brings monetary income;’ while two categories of unemployed are those who 
describe themselves as unemployed and who are looking for a job and those who are unemployed and 
who are not looking for a job. The regression output indicates that living in a household which 
receives remittances is associated with significantly lower chances of employment and this is true of 
all types of settlements. Especially negative associations with employment prospects come out when 
remittances serve as the main source of household income. This associates with 21, 30, and 24 percent 
lower probability of employment in the capital city, urban and rural areas, respectively. The listed 
associations are highly significant even after controlling for respondents’ individual characteristics 
such as gender, age and education. Remittances also correlate with the higher risk of unemployment 
and job searching, but the effect is mainly observed in Tbilisi and other rural areas. If respondents 
lives in a household where remittance are the main source of income then they have 28 and 20 percent 
lower chances of being unemployed rather than having other labour market status. At the same time, 
remittances are negatively associated with being out of employment and not looking for a job.  
Table 13. Remittance and labour market outcomes, regression coefficients from linear 
probability models  
 Total sample Tbilisi Urban areas 
Rural 
areas 
     
Dependent variable: Unemployed and does not 
look. for a job 
    
RR households  –.01 –.07 –.01  .04 
RR households: the main source  .03 –.02  .04  .10* 
RR households: not the main source –.08*** –.15*** –.06*** –.03 
Dependent variable: Unemployed and look. for a 
job 
    
RR households   .12***  .22***  .08  .03 
RR households: the main source  .19***  .28***  .20***  .04 
RR households: not the main source  .01  .07 –.08  .02 
Dependent variable: Employed     
RR households  –.13*** –.14** –.11** –.15*** 
RR households: the main source –.25*** –.21*** –.30*** –.24*** 
RR households: not the main source  .06  .04  .14* –.03 
Notes: ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels. Each coefficient derives from separate 
regressions. Models control for respondents’ gender, age, education, and year dummy for 2010. Sample is restricted to 
population aged 25-59. Weights applied. Robust standard errors calculated, not shown. The statistics and fits of the models 
are available upon request. Source: Author’s calculations based on data from CBS (2009-10)  
Based on the evidence to hand it seems that, if anything, remittances have a negative association on 
prospects of individuals in terms of success on the local labour market. However, the observed effect 
is not conclusive and besides the income effect from remittance inflows is confounded with the effect 
caused by the emigration of family members. The selection effect of the remittance receiving 
households had to be taken into account to have more conclusive evidence of how remittances affect 
employment.  
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5.4. Remittances and inflation 
Recent evidence from cross-national analysis indicates that remittances do generate inflation and this 
effect is more pronounced over the long run (Narayan et al., 2011). Nonetheless, these findings are 
based on the aggregated country-level data, which does not, of course, mean that there should be a 
positive impact of remittance on inflation in Georgia.  
Inflation in Georgia and its possible links to remittances 
In recent years, after a hyperinflationary episode in 1993-1994, when inflation reached 15.607%, 
Georgia has managed to achieve a relatively stable macro-economic environment, keeping inflation 
under a single-digit level (Maliszewski, 2009). In 1999-2003, inflationary processes were mainly 
related to the continuous depreciation of GEL against the USD because the National Bank of Georgia 
was forced to float GEL in the aftermath of the GFC (Bakradze and Billmeier, 2007). However, after 
2003 robust monetary policy and general macroeconomic health meant increased confidence on the 
part of private sector and the households. This resulted in a significant increase in the broad measures 
of money supply (World Bank, 2009), and the loans-to-GDP ratio surged from 8.8 percent in the 
beginning of 2004 to 31.1 percent in the beginning of 2012 (NBG, 2012). These trends, as can be seen 
in Figure 14, resulted in significant higher inflation rates over 2004-2008. In addition to money growth 
and real households’ incomes, according to the National Bank of Georgia inflationary processes have 
been determined by the volatile relative prices of foodstuffs and the price of oil on international 
markets. One of the main determinants of short-run and long-run dynamics of inflation are changes in 
the current exchange rates, which in turn can be related to the inflow of remittances in Georgia.  
 
 
 
Remittances might have links with inflationary process in Georgia through: (a) increased demand 
on goods and services; and (b) currency exchange effect. In the former scenario higher demand would 
drive prices up. Nevertheless, the effect should be small because remittances make about 4 percent of 
overall income, and not all of remittances are spent on consumption. On the other hand, remittances, 
which, along with capital inflows and official assistance from international donors, come in foreign 
currency, might cause appreciation of the Georgian Lari. In an underdeveloped domestic capital 
market such as Georgia, the state via its National Bank has limited capacity for sustaining large 
sterilised interventions5
                                                     
5 “Sterilisation” refers to the process by which a central bank takes actions to negate potentially harmful capital inflows. A 
central bank can intervene on the foreign exchange markets to prevent currency appreciation by selling its own currency 
for foreign currency-denominated assets, building up its foreign reserves as a happy side effect. 
 (EPRC, 2012). It is possible that because of remittances the recipient 
households have to exchange the received USD/EUR/other currencies into GEL. This higher demand 
for the local currency increases its price and, in the end, leads to lower purchasing power for 
remittances, but also to deflationary process because a significant part of consumption in Georgian is 
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import-based. If foreign currency becomes cheaper through inflation it must also reduce import prices. 
The causal mechanism of these processes is complicated still more because money transfer figures are 
calculated in USD, but most money flowing into the country is sent in different currencies.6
Testing the links between remittances and inflation 
  
No studies available for this report empirically show the links between remittances and inflation. The 
only evidence are the results of the simple bivariate analysis. In the models of table 14, we use 
monthly data points on inflation rates from the beginning of 2000 to the middle of 2012 and 
corresponding monthly data points on various remittance measures.7
Table 14. Association between monthly inflation rates and monthly remittances,  
regression coefficients from OLS models 
 The first part of the table 
estimates the associations across the whole period (149 months from January 2000 to June 2012) and 
reveals that the absolute volume of remittances, growth in absolute volumes of remittances and growth 
rates in remittances have negative relations with the monthly inflation rates. In other words, the results 
indicate that in those months when remittances increase, the monthly inflation rates on average 
decreases. Model 4 shows too that one month lagged remittances have no statistically significant 
association with the inflation rate. But if the sample is restricted only to the most recent 53 months 
(January 2008 – June 2012), the one month lagged remittance have, instead, a positive association 
with the rate of inflation.  
 January 2000 – June 2012 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Absolute volume of remittances  –.68** – – – 
Absolute growth of remittance  – –.30*** – – 
Remittances growth rate  – – –.29*** – 
Remittances growth rate, one month lagged – – – –.02 
 January 2008 – June 2012 
 Model 1 Model 1 Model 1 Model 1 
Absolute volume of remittances  –1.32*** – – – 
Absolute growth of remittance  – –.26** – – 
Remittances growth rate  – – –.51** – 
Remittances growth rate, one month lagged – – –  .47** 
Notes: *** denotes statistical significance at the 0.01 level. Models include seasonal and time controls. Dependent and  
independent variables are standardized. Source: Author’s calculations based on data from NBG (2012).  
All in all, there is no straightforward answer as to how remittances are related to inflation in 
Georgia, as the latter is determined by a myriad of factors and within the framework of this analysis it 
is not possible to isolate the hypothetical effect from remittances. Another question is how precisely 
remittances are associated with inflationary processes, if there is, indeed, any significant association 
between those two. The exact effect is hard to define because, on the one hand, remittances might 
decrease inflation through the appreciation of GEL – what we observe in immediate positive 
associations in Table 14. Then, simultaneously, they might increase inflation through the stimulation 
of demand and consumption on the market . This is what we observe for lagged remittances data for 
the more recent period.  
                                                     
6 For instance, in 2007, only 17% of remittances were transferred in USD; 62% in RUB; 8% in EUR; 2% in TRY, all of 
which have different exchange rates and defining processes. How the listed effects actually take place is a question for 
empirical investigation and is, in any case, beyond of the scope of this report. 
7 All employed variables are standardised and compared across models. 
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5.5. Remittances and human capital formation 
Human capital is a multidimensional concept, but this report operationalises it with individuals’ 
educational attainment and their health status. Human-capital formation in turn can be defined as the 
process of directing resources to educational and health related investments. Empirical evidence from 
various contexts and countries suggests that remittances often act as a source for investment in human 
capital or help families to preserve these investments if they face various types of shocks (Calero et 
al., 2009). Although, remittances tend to have positive association with both education and health, this 
effect is often restricted to specific groups of the population, or even within recipient households 
(Acosta et al., 2007).  
General problems of human-capital formation  
The government of Georgia in its constraints analysis identifies that unemployment is a major problem 
largely determined by insufficient education and lack of competitive qualifications and skills among 
labour force (Government of Georgia, 2011). Georgia also ranks consistently low in international 
educational rankings for children and young adults (Kutaladze, 2012). Although the value of education 
has been shrinking over the decades, it still matters, while people with better subjective health have 
better chances of attaining a higher educational and occupational status (Gugushvili, 2012a). The main 
tool through which government invests in healthcare is the Medical Insurance Program for the Poor. 
Although the programme decreases mean out-of-pocket expenditures for some groups and reduces the 
risk of high inpatient expenditures, no systematic effect on the health behaviour, management of 
chronic illnesses, and patient satisfaction are observed (Bauhoff et al., 2011). The majority of 
Georgians have to make out-of-pocket payments for their medical bills. Therefore, we would expect 
that one of the main channels through which remittances can positively affect development in Georgia 
is the expansion of possibilities for educational and healthcare investments.  
The most appropriate way to evaluate the links between remittance and human capital formation is 
to understand associations between remittance recipients, on the one hand, and their human-capital 
status and investment patterns, on the other. If there are links between remittances and investments in 
health and education, they must be manifested in better educational attainment and health status and 
higher expenditures on healthcare and education services among recipients, in comparison to non-
recipients. The trend in the share of education and healthcare expenditure in an average household’s 
monthly consumption in Figure 15 indicates that the relative expenditure on education has not changed 
much, 2001-2011, remaining at about 4 percent of household cash consumption. Still the cost of 
higher education has increased in recent years reaching 2515 USD for tuition at the most prestigious 
and 928 USD at the least prestigious university by 20078
                                                     
8 This is significant amount of money as 2,515 USD was, in 2007, two times the  subsistence minimum of an average family 
for an entire year. 
 (Chankseliani, 2012). On the other hand 
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expenditure on healthcare has been increasing in relative terms, and it almost doubled from 5.7 to 11.6 
percent in the last decade. This can be explained by ongoing privatisation in healthcare system and by 
households’ higher ability to invest in healthcare for their members. This leads us to believe that if 
there is a positive impact of remittances for human capital formation, this is most likely manifested via 
healthcare investments.  
Empirical evidence on the links between remittances and human capital development 
The available empirical evidence on the links between remittances and human-capital development is 
fragmented and inconclusive. The analysis of the Caucasus Barometer for the early 2000s shows that 
remittances were not associated with the higher probability of spending on education among migrant 
households (Dermendzhieva, 2011). On the other hand, the EBRD’s National Public Opinion Survey 
on Remittances for 2007 indicates that 26 percent of remittance recipient households used them for 
educational and 21 per cent for health/life insurance purposes (EBRD, 2007). The analysis of the 2008 
Georgia on the Move survey reveals that receiving remittances increased absent migrant households’ 
annual expenditure on healthcare by 221 GEL, while a higher level of spending on education costs by 
66 GEL was also detected in recipient households. The latter might be the result of the higher costs 
and fees households pay for better quality healthcare and educational services, while the former trend 
is in line with significantly growing healthcare expenditure shown in Figure 15. In addition, while 
households in rural areas that receive remittances are less likely to have members in poor health, in 
Tbilisi the effect is reversed (Tchaidze and Torosyan, 2010). It is also demonstrated that remittances 
are much more strongly and positively correlated with spending on education and healthcare in cities 
than rural areas. This probably can be explained by the fact that the overall level of human capital 
investment is much higher in urban Georgia (Gerber and Torosyan, 2010).  
Table 15. The matching estimators of remittance effects on expenditures on health and 
education, average affects of migration on migrant households 
 All Urban Households 
All Rural 
households 
Urban AM 
households 
Rural AM 
households 
Medical care 237.47* 82.26 301.69* 71.41 
School expenses 89.39* -18.67 119.58* 10.86 
Notes: *denotes statistically significant effect. AM=Absent migrants. Source: Gerber and Torosyan (2010) 
For the current report we also conducted the primary analysis of the LITS and the CBS surveys. 
The first dataset showed that, in 2006, those who were aged 18-25 and who lived in remittance 
recipient households were more likely to be outside the educational system than those youngsters 
living in non-recipient households.9 Different results emerge from the analysis of the Caucasus 
Barometer which refers to 2009-2010. First of all, those who live in (remittance) recipient households 
have slightly higher trust in the healthcare system controlling for age and gender of respondents.10
                                                     
9 Receiving remittances decreased the probability of being in education by 23 percent and this relationship is held at 95 
percent of statistical significance. Model controlled for age of respondents.   
 
Table 16 shows that those who live in receiving households express higher subjective health: though 
this relationship is significant only in urban areas outside Tbilisi. In rural areas, meanwhile it 
negatively correlates with perceived health status when remittances function as a second or other 
source of income. The same table also shows that the relationship between remittances and the 
respondent’s (those who are under 30 years old) probability of being a student. If anything, receiving 
remittances is identified as having positive links with being in education in Tbilisi, while this 
association is negative in other urban and rural areas. 
10 The level of trust in the healthcare system depends on a 5-point scale from full distrust to full trust.  
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Table 16. Subjective perception of health and propensity of being a student and remittance,  
regression coefficients from OLS models 
 Total sample Tbilisi Urban areas 
Rural 
areas 
Dependent variable: Subjective health 
conditions 
    
RR households   .05  .07  .17*** –.08  
RR households: the main source  .06  .06  .01  .10 
RR households: not the main source  .02  .07  .30*** –.23** 
Dependent variable: Being a student     
RR households   .11*  .19* –.05  .01 
RR households: the main source  .17**  .27** –.01 –.05*** 
RR households: not the main source  .01 –.01 –.09***  .07 
Notes: RR=Remittance recipient. Respondents’ age, gender, education are controlled for. When the dependent variables is 
being a student, the sample size is restricted to those aged 18-30. Source: Own calculations based on the Caucasus Barometer 
for 2009 and 2010 
Based on the evidence presented it can be concluded that remittances appear to have some positive 
effect on educational and health status and investments in both of these areas. The effect of 
remittances in human capital formation is observed in urban areas, probably due to the greater 
availability of healthcare and educational service there. However as remittances are received by about 
10 percent of the population and as most of their share is spent on immediate consumption, 
remittances overall have only a marginal effect on Georgia’s human capital formation. As outlined at 
the beginning of this section, the major reason for unemployment as declared by the government is the 
mismatch of skills on the labour market and it seems unlikely that remittances should have any 
meaningful effect on this problem.  
5.6. Remittances, poverty and income inequality 
The effect of remittances on poverty and inequality depends, primarily, on what type of households 
are likely to be recipients. Many comparative studies show that remittances reduce the level, depth, 
and severity of poverty in recipient countries (Adams Jr and Page, 2005). But the effect on poverty 
and inequality is generally small (Acosta et al., 2008). The measuring of remittances’ true effects 
requires longitudinal data on actual poverty and inequality levels before and after receiving 
remittances, something which goes beyond the scope of the present report. Nevertheless, the short 
review of poverty and inequality trends and available empirical evidence and a simple first-hand 
analysis of the issue can shed some more light on our understanding of social welfare impact of 
remittances.  
Poverty and inequality in Georgia  
From the early 1990s, poverty and income inequality in Georgia were linked to labour market 
conditions: unemployment, underemployment and low incomes from the precarious jobs (World 
Bank, 1999). This relationship intensified in recent years (Gugushvili, 2011). Figure 16 shows that the 
poverty level according to the national subsistence minimum in 2009 was 41.2 percent; while, on the 
other hand, the relative poverty level measured by 60 percent of median consumption in 2011, stood at 
23.0 percent. Inequality levels in Georgia are also high. The country inequality levels were already 
substantial during the Soviet period (Dikhanov, 1996) and, then, intensified with the start of the 
transition. Figure 16 also shows that Gini coefficients for total incomes and expenditure were more 
than .40 which is considered to be high in terms of international comparisons. Inequality levels are 
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higher if the Gini coefficient is estimated by total monetary incomes and expenditure which remain 
above .50 threshold. The described trends indicate that poverty and inequality remained consistently 
high over recent years, but it is unclear to what extent remittances contributed to observed trends.  
 
Emigration intentions (Gugushvili, 2012d) as well as emigration behaviour (Badurashvili, 2004) 
are strongly correlated, in Georgia, with the households’ socio-economic conditions. Sending 
remittance for the family members who stay in Georgia is, on the other hand, largely motivated by 
poverty and inequality concerns. The question, though, is how remittances affect poverty and 
inequality. By establishing approximate income levels of emigrants abroad in relation to their probable 
income had they remained in Georgia, the IMO report asserts that this discrepancy is a strong pull 
factor for emigration decisions not only towards European and North American destinations, but also 
towards the Russian Federation (IOM, 2003). If relatively better off households are more likely to 
receive remittances then they can intensify inequality in the country. The effect of remittance on 
poverty and inequality might entail the appreciation of the local currency and inflation rate. The 
strengthening of the GEL since 2004 brought a relative decrease in the value of remittances. Higher 
inflation cannot only reduce relative importance of remittances for recipient families, but can also 
decrease the real income of populations. Regardless of how remittances influence inflation, higher 
prices lead to the devaluation of remittances and are, therefore, associated with the lower wellbeing of 
overall population.  
How far do remittances affect poverty and inequality levels?  
There are a few studies which estimate the impact of remittances on social welfare. To start with, 29.4 
per cent of the Georgia on the Move survey respondents claimed remittances were instrumental in 
alleviating poverty and helping recipients (Tchaidze and Torosyan, 2010). Through analysis of the 
impact of remittances on poor households’ production patterns across Georgian regions, it has been 
found that remittance flows do not affect all sectors and residents symmetrically. They have, in fact, a 
rather limited impact in terms of poverty and income inequality (Uzagalieva and Menezes, 2009). This 
limited effect is explained by the fact that wealthier households benefit disproportionately from 
remittances compared with poorer households. Another factor why remittances are not decisive for 
poverty reduction is that they are disproportionally directed towards urban areas as opposed to the 
families in rural Georgia: it is rural Georgia, which since the end of 1990s, has had the higher poverty 
levels (UNDP and Government of Georgia, 2005). Remittances might even intensify inequality and 
poverty if the latter is measured by relative poverty levels.11
                                                     
11 In fact, the government of Georgia has used relative poverty levels as the default measurement for poverty since 2004. 
 Overall, it is also acknowledged that 
remittances only alleviate poverty in recipient families, and maybe other families. Remittances 
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stimulate demand, but they fall short in terms of eliminating or even substantially reducing poverty in 
the country (Kakulia, 2007). 
The recent report on the Social Impact of Emigration in Georgia, employing data from the 
Integrated Household Surveys 2004-2009, shows that remittances associate with the lower poverty 
levels by 2-2.5%, if 60% of median consumption is taken as the poverty threshold. At the same time, 
only 3-4% of remittance-receiving households are from the poorest consumption quintile. This share 
is, meanwhile, 8-9% for the wealthiest 5th quintile. The authors also conclude that the Gini-coefficient 
derived with hypothetical absence of migrants’ remittances is associated with about 2 percentage 
points higher level of inequality (Badurashvili and Nadareishvili, 2012).  
 
Figure 17 shows the levels of poverty and remittance recipients across Georgian regions. The 
distribution of the poor strongly associates with the distribution of remittances (not shown on the 
graph). This association does not imply that remittances affect poverty, but rather shows that the 
distribution of poverty and remittances both depend on the relative share of populations in the 
corresponding regions. More informative is the second graph, which shows a crude relationship 
between poverty levels and recipients share. A simple correlation between these variables is negative 
and significant, which means that those regions which have a higher level of remittance recipients 
poverty levels are generally lower. This does not necessarily imply that remittance reduce poverty. But 
it might be taken to mean that people are more likely to emigrate from regions where poverty is not 
very extensive and, thereafter, begin sending remittances. Whatever the relationship may be, the 
regions with relatively low poverty rates such as Tbilisi, Imereti, Samtskhe-Javakheti, and Samegrelo-
Zemo Svaneti have a relatively high share of remittance receivers. The opposite is the case for the 
most deprived regions such as Kvemo Kartli, Adjara, Mtskheta-Mtianeti and Kakheti.  
Table 17 shows the associations between various objective and subjective measures of poverty, 
living in a remittance-recipient households based on the CBS dataset. We present models with three 
separate dependent variables: perceived economic status of a household where 1 is the lowest and 10 
the highest status; perceived relative wellbeing of household where 1 is very poor and 5 is very good; 
and households’ monthly spending where 1 is up to 50 USD and 7 is more than 1200 USD. OLS 
regressions coefficients indicate that significant and positive associations exist between remittances 
and utilised social welfare measures. In all geographic areas, and across three dependent variables, 
receiving remittances in the form of the first or other source of income leads to higher welfare 
outcomes. The associations are particularly strong in rural areas for the perceived relative wellbeing of 
households. Receiving remittance in these families leads to .48 and .29 points higher value of 
dependent variables in comparison to non-receiving households. Last but not least, for sensitivity 
checks, we also analysed whether or not the effect of remittances is maintained when models include 
only those at the bottom of of welfare distribution: the three lowest ranks for perceived economic 
status of household; the two lowest categories of relative wellbeing of household; and the two lowest 
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ranks of households’ monthly spending. The results again confirm that remittances, with the outlined 
restrictions, maintain a significant effect on poverty and inequality measures.12
Table 17. The wellbeing of households and remittances,  
regression coefficients from OLS models 
  
 Total sample Tbilisi Urban areas 
Rural 
areas 
Dep. var.: Perceived economic status of 
household  
    
RR households   .47***  .50***  .45***  .46*** 
RR households: the main source  .60***  .48**  .50**  .94*** 
RR households: not the main source  .27**  .45  .35**  .02 
Dep. var.: Perceived relative wellbeing of 
household 
    
RR households   .30***  .20***  .31***  .39*** 
RR households: the main source  .32***  .20**  .32***  .48*** 
RR households: not the main source  .24***  .14  .26***  .29*** 
Dep. var.: Household spending last month     
RR households   .25***  .37***  .21*  .04 
RR households: the main source  .21**  .32**  .10 -.01 
RR households: not the main source  .26***  .38*  .30**  .07 
Notes: Perceived economic status of household: 1=the lowest rung, 10=the highest rung; Perceived relative wellbeing of 
household: 1=Very poor, 5=Very good; Household spending last month: 1=up to 50 USD, 7=More than 1200 USD. 
Respondents’ age, gender, education and employment status are controlled. Source: Own calculations based on the Caucasus 
Barometer for 2009 and 2010  
It can be concluded that poverty and inequality in Georgia remain a central problem. However, 
the effect of remittances in the observed trends is not clear. If we assume that migrants are rational 
agents who prefer emigration to staying in the country then we must conclude that remittances 
increase social welfare. Better quality data is necessary to assess causal links, but the available 
evidence indicates that the regions with higher remittances experience lower poverty levels, while 
living in a remittance recipient household is associated with scoring higher on various welfare 
indicators and avoiding the bottom portion of welfare distribution. This leads us to the final question 
of the report: if remittances are indeed correlated with better welfare outcomes, do they affect public 
policies implemented in the country?  
6. Remittances, public moral hazard, informalised welfare and policy trap 
Remittances may create a “public moral hazard” because recipient households are able to resolve their 
immediate problems, at least partially, with the help of transferred resources, which in turn encourages 
the state to divert its attention to other priorities. It has been shown that in a poorly governed countries 
remittances have a negative impact on public spending for education and health (Hubert Ebeke, 2012). 
It is not possible to observe directly whether or not a “public moral hazard” exists in Georgia because 
we are not able to observe how government would have behaved in the absence of remittances. We 
can, though, still speculate on possible links.  
 
                                                     
12 In addition, we have also checked how remittances are associated with the top welfare categories in relation to the middle 
welfare categories. The results showed that the effects of remittance are not significant for the highest part of welfare 
distribution and therefore that they cannot contribute to inequality in this way. 
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 6.1 Possible impact channels  
One of the main means by which incomes are generated in the private sector is the transfer of 
remittances. This leaves room for the possible existence of a ‘public moral hazard’ problem, which 
would mean a reduction in the political will to undertake investments and reforms across economic 
and social policies. As about 10-15 percent of Georgia’s households are recipients, remittances play an 
important role in the political economy of social welfare. The large inflow of remittances allows a 
significant share of the population to satisfy their basic needs and possibly to improve their health and 
education. Neoliberal economic and social policies intended to reduce public involvement in private 
lives by reducing regulations and the size of civil service in the country. Georgia’s socio-economic 
policies, 2004-2011, mostly derived from the vision, according to which the driving force of the 
country‘s advancement would be the private sector (Government of Georgia, 2011). As we saw in the 
previous sections, the elderly, fifty or over, and the poorest are less likely to be remittance recipients 
than the younger and the better-off population. This coincides with the social policies implemented by 
the government since 2004. The government’s social policies were directed mainly in two dimensions: 
investing in old-age pensions; and targeted social assistance programmes. Pensions have been 
continuously growing since 2004, reaching on average 125 GEL by September 2012, but without 
attempting to reform it systemically (Gugushvili, 2012c). On the other hand, targeted social assistance 
has been introduced since 2006, targeting the most disadvantaged. However the number of those who 
seek assistance is much higher than those who actually qualify for the benefits (Baumann, 2012). At 
the same time, while remittances allow the recipients to spend more on health and education, Georgia 
spends a considerably lower share of public resources on public health and education than politically 
and economically more successful transition societies. 
 
Recent citizenship policies may be linked to remittances. Since 2004 Georgia has been classified as 
an emigration state, which according to De Haas (2007), have long-term economic incentives to 
strengthen ties with their absent migrants. As we have seen in the previous section Georgia is largely 
dependent on remittances to finance its trade deficit and to avoid the discontent of the poor but not the 
poorest population. Since 2004 the government of the country has implement more inclusive migration 
policies by effectively allowing dual citizenship and by granting some political and economic rights to 
expatriates (Gugushvili, 2012b). Indeed, the dual citizenship initiative was justified by huge brain 
drain in Georgia, since the early 1990s. According to the President of Georgia, around one million 
Georgians lived abroad, among them many businessmen and well-trained professionals. Thus, 
favourable conditions had to be created for attracting them back and dual citizenship became one of 
the central mechanisms for achieving this goal (Civil Georgia, 2003). The question of whether dual 
citizenship affects remittances and how this in turn has an effect on public moral hazard is beyond the 
scope of this report. The fact, though, that more than 26,900 Russian Federation citizens, mostly of 
Georgian decent, were granted Georgian citizenship, might have consequences for remittances and 
related public moral hazard. After all, about half of total transferred remittances are sent from Russia.  
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6.2 Empirical evidence on the links between public moral hazard and remittances  
As with most of this report, on the basis of available evidence only associative conclusions can be 
made on the links between remittances and “public moral hazard.” Figure 19 shows that there is a 
moderate but negative correlation between the levels of remittance recipients and the levels of social 
assistance beneficiaries across the Georgian regions. The correlative analysis also suggests that the 
higher number of TSA recipients is associated with the lower GDP per capita rates in the listed 
regions, but the share of remittance recipients is not significantly linked to per capita economic output 
in these territorial units. This might suggest that remittances serve as a social safety net for those 
individuals who are not the poorest but who would be in need of targeted social assistance without 
remittances. On the other hand, micro-level data in table 5 shows how receiving remittance relates to 
the probability of receiving public benefits in Georgia. Linear probability models control for age, 
gender, education and the employment status of respondents, while independent variables is 
respondents’ households receiving government benefits. As can be seen, the association between the 
two is negative in all types of settlements, but this relationship reaches statistical significance only 
when remittances constitute the prime source of household income. This effect is particularly strong in 
Tbilisi where remittances reduce the chances of receiving public benefits by 18 percent. Table 5 also 
presents regression coefficients which exclude retirement-age population, thus isolating the effect of 
old-age pensions. Although the statistical significance of the results decrease, the direction of the 
relationship persists: having remittances in a household mean that it is less like that the household will 
receive public benefits. This is again particularly true for Tbilisi.  
Table 18. Receiving state benefits and remittances, regression coefficients from OLS models 
 Total sample Tbilisi 
Urban 
areas 
Rural 
areas 
Dependent variable: Receiving state benefits 
(pensioners included) 
    
RR households  –.09*** –.13*** –.06 –.06 
RR households: the main source –.15*** –.18*** –.13* –.12** 
RR households: not the main source –.01 –.02  .03 –.00 
Dependent variable: Receiving state benefits 
(pensioners excluded) 
    
RR households  –.09*** –.14*** –.03 –.07 
RR households: the main source –.12*** –.15***  –.07 –.09 
RR households: not the main source –.04 –.08  .02 –.03  
Notes: ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels. Each coefficient derives from a separate 
regression. Models control for respondents’ gender, age, education, employment status, and year dummy for 2010; weights 
applied; robust standard errors calculated, not shown. Statistics of models and fits of the models are available upon request. 
Source: Own calculations based on the CBS for 2009-10  
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In sum, this section focused on possible links between remittances and “public moral hazard” in Georgia. 
It focussed particularly on, first, stimulating relationships with ethnically Georgian expatriates by 
introducing dual citizenship. Then, second, it looked at two social policy areas – targeted social 
assistance for the poorest and old-age retirement pensions – which are less likely to be affected by 
remittances, as seen in Section 4 of this report. The empirical evidence we have looked at shows that 
individuals who live in recipient households are less likely to be beneficiaries of welfare assistance, 
including pensions, while those regions which have a higher share of remittances also have the lower 
share of social assistance recipients. Earlier report has showed that remittance associate with the lower 
odds of employment and higher odds of unemployment which possibly relaxes pressure from the 
government in terms of job creation, or more intensive reforms in healthcare and education systems. 
7. Conclusions and policy recommendations 
Migration and remittances: From the mid 1990s remittances started to become an important 
component of socio-economic life in Georgia and data on remittance inflows became available for the 
country. Although there is a relatively good coverage on formal macro-level trends in remittances, the 
data on informal channels and the individual-level datasets are of limited use. Much of the findings 
presented in this report were derived from standalone surveys on migration and remittances, which do 
not allow us to make a longitudinal analysis. A measure for improving data coverage might be an 
integration of additional questions on remittances in the Caucasus Barometer, which is the annual 
survey of a representative sample of the Georgian population. It is also worth contemplating on 
systematically conducted migration surveys for the country.  
Remittance and growth: The strong observed association between economic growth and remittances is 
likely to stem from the confluent economic growth in Georgia and the major remittance sending 
economies. But the greatest impact on growth seems likely to be consumption stimulation and the 
multiplier effect in the trade sector, which by 2010 became the largest part of the economy. The major 
effort to increase the value of remittances for economic growth needs policies which affect the indirect 
channels of remittances – investments and savings, human-capital formation, and employment. 
Remittances, investment and financial development: Our study indicates that remittances have some 
effect on financial development and investments in Georgia, by affecting savings, bank account 
ownership and investment intentions. However, the scope of this impact does not significantly affect 
the overall savings and investments in the country. One way of increasing the positive effects of 
remittance on investment and financial development would be to encourage commercial banks to 
provide a greater variety of financial products and attractive special offers to clients who have a 
proven permanent inflow of remittances.  
Remittances and employment: Employment (or rather its absence) is one of the most severe 
socioeconomic problems in Georgia and remittances do not appear to have any significant impact, 
even on self-employment and entrepreneurship. Furthermore, remittances are likely to increase 
unemployment chances among those individuals who reside in recipient households. On the positive 
side, it in the narrow labour market, remittances seem to stimulate the likelihood of employment 
among those who would otherwise have to compete with remittance recipients. One way by which 
remittances might be helpful for labour market is the provision of resources for successful job hunting 
and better matching between employers and employees.  
Remittances and inflation: One reason that we have not found any significant links between 
remittances and inflation in Georgia is that the effect might go in two ways. On the one hand, 
remittances, through the appreciation of GEL, might negatively affect inflation. Then, on the other 
hand, remittances might have a positive impact on inflation through the stimulation of demand and 
market consumption. Any direct policy intervention in the remittances-inflation nexus seems to be 
unnecessary. It could, though, be useful to quantify the exact channels by which remittances raise the 
general level of prices of goods and services over a given period of time. 
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Remittances and human capital formation: The results show that recipient households spend more on 
education and healthcare and urban recipients also report higher subjective health status and 
educational enrolment. This might be one of the most positive effects stemming from remittances. 
However a major problem is that investment in human capital formation is an almost exclusively 
urban phenomenon. In order for remittances to have a stronger effect on skills and health conditions in 
rural areas, educational and healthcare services should be provided locally. This, of course, relates to 
broader structural problems in the country.  
Remittances, poverty and income inequality: Remittances seem to have positive impact on social 
welfare but the identification of causal effect is problematic. On the one hand, remittance recipient 
households are better off than non-recipients households. With the available data it is not, though, 
possible to conclude that remittances reduce poverty levels. It might well be the case that migrants, 
and consequently remitters, come from a selected group of households who would be better off even 
without remittances. One way to understand the causal effect is to integrate remittance questions in 
longitudinal social surveys. The direct and indirect facilitation of migration for the most disadvantages 
social groups through provisioning migration-related information and consolations could have, then, 
poverty implications 
Public moral hazard: There is some indication that remittances create public moral hazard in Georgia. 
Those regions and social groups which are underrepresented among remittance recipients are more 
likely to receive public investments through targeted social assistance and old-age pensions. These 
policies help to reduce poverty in Georgia but targeting social security has been characterised in 
relevant literature with substantial side-effects and stigmatisation. A major recommendation in terms 
of the links between public moral hazard and remittances would be more inclusive social and 
economic policies which improve life chances of individuals, and especially children, regardless of 
their households’ remittance recipient status.  
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